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NOTES
BLANK  CHECKS:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF  EMERGENCY




Climate change, like terrorism, demands a response warranted by what it
is: an emergency.  At least, this is the argument put forth by President Barack
Obama during both terms of his presidency characterizing the failure of the
American people to reduce and remove the threat of climate change as a
“betray[al] [of] our children and future generations.”1  In order to combat
“one of [the] greatest challenges of our time,” President Obama released the
2013 President’s Climate Action Plan (“CAP”),2 outlining in detail the steps
the administration intended to take to curb the impact of environmental
changes and to ensure the United States was taking steps to be a global
leader in the fight against climate change.  In particular, the CAP focused on
decreasing the emission of Greenhouse Gases (“GHGs”)—specifically car-
bon, hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), and methane—into the atmosphere, as
these GHGs have been identified as a leading cause of rising atmospheric
temperatures.3  The alarming tone of these scientific conclusions have led
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Arts in
History Honors and Theology, University of Notre Dame, 2016.  I would like to thank
Professor John Copeland Nagle for his continuous guidance and advice, my family for
their endless support and love, the Thursday Night Networking Society, and the staff of the
Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent editing and encouragement.  All errors are my
own.
1 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama (Jan. 21,
2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-
address-president-barack-obama.
2 THE EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 5
(2013) [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION PLAN].
3 See Climate Change Indicators: Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/greenhouse-gases (last updated Feb. 22, 2017).
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some politicians to argue strongly for the enforcement—or perhaps just forc-
ing—of compliance with the measures modern scientists believe will remedy,
or at least slow, the tide of climate change.4
The tone of the CAP, although not nearly as apocalyptic, is urgent and
firm regarding the President’s obligations to promote technologies and poli-
cies for alternative energy sources and reduction of the emission of GHGs.5
In particular, the CAP insists that hydrofluorocarbons must be reduced and
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must use its authority
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to accomplish this goal.6  Rather than
presenting the work of the EPA as a policy recommendation from the admin-
istration, it reads as a directive in stating that the EPA “will use its authority,”
to prohibit certain uses of HFCs and encourages the use of “climate-friendly
chemicals” in their wake.7
In an effort to promote and accomplish the policy directive of the
administration, the EPA promulgated the “Protection of Stratospheric
Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain Substitutes Under the Signifi-
cant New Alternatives Policy Program,” known commonly as the “2015 Rule,”
which regulates the use of HFCs by manufacturers.8  This action was taken
because HFCs are a potent GHG used in the production of many everyday
products such as “aerosols, refrigeration, automotive air conditioners, and
foams.”9  The particular attention paid to HFCs by the Obama administra-
tion was related to the projected increase of nearly doubled usage of HFCs by
2020.10
Through the 2015 Rule, the EPA drew upon section 612 of the CAA to
assert that the EPA, through its statutorily granted authority to require all
manufacturers to replace ozone-depleting substances with safe substitutes,
could regulate the use of HFCs by manufacturers beyond their initial replace-
4 See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1169
(E.D. Cal. 2007) (“Ongoing scientific research into the area of climate science has pro-
duced a continuous stream of analytical documents that, over recent time, point with
increasing alarm to the rapidity of evolution of measurable changes in climate instability
and evince a growing consensus that human-caused greenhouse gas emissions must be
curtailed more rather than less and sooner rather than later.”).
5 CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 4 (stating that the President “remains firmly
committed” to the goals outlined in the CAP because “climate change is no longer a dis-
tant threat”).
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id. (emphasis added).  This Note operates under the assumption that the CAP is
not an executive order; although there may be an argument that due to the directive gram-
matical format, it should be considered as such because executive orders are a matter of
substance, not form.
8 Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain Substitutes
Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,870 (July 20, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) [hereinafter The 2015 Rule].
9 Final Brief for Respondent at 6, Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1328) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
10 CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 10.
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ment of ozone-depleting substances as well.11  In particular, the argument
relied upon the utilization of the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP)
Program to accomplish this regulation.12  Title VI of the CAA, the location of
section 612(a), charges the EPA with administration over the requirements
for manufacturers to replace ozone-depleting substances with specifically
identified “safe substitutes.”13  Additionally, through section 612(c) Congress
mandated that the EPA publish a list of “safe substitutes” and those prohib-
ited from use by manufacturers so that manufacturers could readily comply
with the demands of section 612(a).  Initially after the enactment of Title VI
of the CAA, the EPA listed HFC as a safe substitute because the substance is
non–ozone depleting and was thus readily used by manufacturers.  However,
in 2009 after another decade of research, the EPA concluded that although
HFCs are not ozone depleting, they are a “potent” GHG with an extremely
high Global Warming Potential (GWP).14  This designation as a GHG means
the release of HFCs likely contributes to climate change and “may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare.”15  Therefore, through
the 2015 Rule the EPA used their authority under section 612(c) to remove
HFCs from the safe substitute list.  This removal of HFC was uncontestably
within the EPA’s statutorily granted authority and specifically occurred “in
response to the CAP” expectations.16
This is where the agreement on the permissibility of this agency action
ends.  The 2015 Rule went one step further than just removing HFCs from
the safe substitute list, but also required all current manufacturers who had
already replaced ozone-depleting substances with HFCs to discontinue the
use of HFC and to replace the HFC in their manufacturing process again
with a secondary replacement chemical from the updated safe substitutes
list.17  When challenged, the EPA relied upon section 612 to argue in sup-
port of their actions under the 2015 Rule: that the CAA granted the Agency
the authority to suspend the use of HFCs in all circumstances of their present
use by industry because the word “replace” does not apply solely to the first
11 The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  The Clean Air Act is discussed in more depth in Part I.
12 42 U.S.C. § 7671k(c) (2012).
13 Id. § 7671k(b)(2), (c).
14 The 2015 Rule, supra note 8, at 42,879, 42,888.  Global Warming Potential is
defined as “a measure of how much energy the emissions of 1 ton of a gas will absorb over
a given period of time, relative to the emissions of 1 ton of carbon dioxide (CO2).” Green-
house Gas Emissions: Understanding Global Warming Potentials, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/understanding-global-warming-potentials
(last updated Feb. 14, 2017).
15 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 7.
16 The 2015 Rule, supra note 8, at 42,942.
17 This initial replacement under the EPA’s jurisdiction is what may be thought of as a
first generation replacement. See Joint Brief of Petitioners at 10–12, Mexichem Fluor, Inc.
v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1328) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
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generation replacement of ozone-depleting substances, but also to those sub-
stitutes instituted in the wake of those ozone-depleting materials as well.18
During this public comment period for the 2015 Rule in 2014, the EPA
received at least 227 comments on the proposed rule, some of which
expressed concern both about the feasibility and legal authority of the
Agency to take the actions suggested.19  One of the public commenters was
Mexichem Fluor, Inc., a global leader in the development, manufacture, and
supply of fluoroproducts, whose comment raised concern about the inability
of section 612 to confer regulatory authority to the EPA beyond the initial
replacement of ozone-depleting substances.20  However, this comment,
amongst others, did not stall the passage of the 2015 Rule.  As the effects of
the 2015 Rule directly injured Mexichem Fluor by preventing the further use
of HFC, a fluoroproduct, the company brought suit against the EPA.
This Note discusses the separation of powers issues raised in the D.C.
Circuit by then-Judge, now Justice Kavanaugh in Mexichem Fluor’s suit.  Spe-
cifically, this Note analyzes the federal government’s approach to climate
change, overreach of the EPA to act beyond its statutorily granted authority,
and the EPA’s reliance upon President Obama’s executive directives as the
justification for its overreach.  Part I of this Note provides a broad introduc-
tion of the CAA and the importance of the policy motivations for the later
addition of Title VI to the Act.  Part II discusses in more depth the decision
in Mexichem Fluor v. EPA and why the 2015 Rule prompts separation of pow-
ers concerns.  In Part III, this Note explores the constitutional framework for
the separation of powers amongst the three branches of government during
ordinary events.  Alternatively, Part IV looks at the constitutional framework
for emergency powers by the President in the historical and modern contexts
and provides an example of emergency powers delegated to an agency.  Part
V discusses the ramifications of providing a blank check to an executive
agency in an emergency, but ultimately provides three alternative actions an
agency could take while maintaining the constitutional separation of powers.
Finally, Part VI discusses the current status of the Mexichem decision and its
role in Kavanaugh’s recent appointment to the United States Supreme
Court.  This Note concludes that just as the Supreme Court has held in the
arena of terrorism, the standard procedures of constitutional governmental
action should be followed in response to climate change because our separa-
tion of powers doctrines both provide stability and strengthen the nation’s
ability to respond to crises and emergencies.21
I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Throughout the late 1960s it was widely recognized by the American
public that the quality of air breathed by the average person in the United
18 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 20.
19 See id. at 10–11.
20 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 18–19.
21 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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States was subpar, largely due to the boom of industrial development and
growth in the use of cars during the previous century.22  For many years,
both industrial factories and cars burned fossil fuels and released the byprod-
ucts directly into the air.  At the time, even if the problem was recognized,
there was no federal law that could have been invoked to regulate either the
automobile industry or industrial development more broadly.  Rather, com-
mon-law nuisance or state regulations were relied upon to manage the issue
from the legal perspective.23  However, by the 1960s there was an almost uni-
versal consensus that something must be done to address the problem of air
pollution.  Congress responded by enacting the Clean Air Act in 1970 to cre-
ate a federal law that would be promulgated through uniform, national stan-
dards but implemented through a balance of both state and federal
authority.24  The CAA was considerably revised in the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 (“1990 Amendments”),25 which provided the EPA with a
much broader grant of statutory authority to regulate air pollution and set
the tone for its modern province.26
Aligned with the overall mission of the EPA: “[T]o protect human
health and the environment,” the ongoing goals of the CAA are to decrease
ambient air pollutants, reduce the release of toxic chemicals that have been
linked to human illnesses, and to phase out the creation and use of ozone-
depleting chemicals.27  In order to achieve these objectives, the CAA uses a
series of programs and provisions to monitor ambient air quality through
various permitting procedures.  While the CAA and its amendments raise a
variety of legal issues, the question of proper constitutional agency action
through the 2015 Rule is confined to the EPA’s reliance upon Title VI for its
authority.
Title VI of the CAA was adopted as a part of the 1990 Amendments and
directly responded to the Montreal Protocol, a product of the Vienna Con-
vention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.28  Title VI of the CAA
addresses the EPA’s authority as it relates to stratospheric ozone protection
22 See History of Reducing Air Pollution from Transportation in the United States, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/air-pollution-transportation/accomplishments-
and-success-air-pollution-transportation (last updated Apr. 19, 2018).
23 See J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 164–65 (4th
ed. 2017); see also ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 2 (2007), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/peg.pdf
[hereinafter THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE].
24 RUHL ET AL., supra note 23, at 166 (“Much of the CAA can be understood as a
product of . . . ‘cooperative federalism,’ as a dynamic balance between federal standard
setting and state implementation.”).
25 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codefied
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
26 See THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE, supra note 23, at 2.
27 Id. at 4.
28 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Summary: Title VI, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-act-amendment-summary-title-
vi (last updated Jan. 4, 2017).
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and an increased recognition of the importance of ozone’s preservation.29
The Montreal Protocol is an international agreement that was finalized in
1987 and ratified by the United States in 1988.30  It binds each of the Proto-
col signees to the goal of “phasing out the production and consumption of
ozone-depleting substances” and has been amended four times, most
recently in 2016.31  Ever since the initial adoption, the United States has
been a global leader under the Protocol in its efforts to reduce ozone deple-
tion by taking strong domestic action to phase out ozone-depleting sub-
stances.32  This long-lasting success of the United States stems directly from
the introduction and enforcement of Title VI, which itself echoes the Proto-
col by “requir[ing] the phaseout of the production, use, and consumption of
certain substances that contribute to depletion of the earth’s stratospheric
ozone layer.”33  The direct action by Congress in both adopting the Montreal
Protocol and taking action toward its implementation through Title VI high-
lights the elevated importance the legislature has given to the protection of
the ozone layer.
The basic mechanics of Title VI require the EPA first to identify sub-
stances containing various chemical compounds known to have a depletory
effect on ozone, and then to break down this list of substances into two differ-
ent classes based upon their potency.34  Title VI then lays out various time-
lines and reporting requirements for phasing out the uses of both classes of
ozone-depleting substances, as well as important provisions specifically
regarding motor vehicle air conditioning units.35  The Significant New Alter-
native Policy is the process through which the EPA reviews potential substi-
tutes for both classes of ozone-depleting substances within a framework that
compares the potential risks associated with the potential substitute.36  The
criteria used by SNAP does not require a substitute to be risk free, but rather
under section 612 of Title VI, the EPA must prohibit the use of any particular
substitute for a class I or class II substance if there is another available option
that presents a lesser overall risk to human health and the environment.37
There are five different types of criteria used by the EPA under SNAP to
determine “the acceptability of new substitutes,” with the ultimate aim of pos-
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2012).
30 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/chemicalpollution/83007.htm (last visited Nov. 27,
2017).
31 Id. The United States has participated in and adopted each of the four amend-
ments. Id.
32 Id.
33 RUHL ET AL., supra note 23, at 167.
34 42 U.S.C. § 7671a.
35 Id. at §§ 7671b–7671j.
36 Overview of SNAP, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/snap/over
view-snap (last updated June 14, 2017) [hereinafter Overview of SNAP].
37 42 U.S.C. § 7671k(c).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL209.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-DEC-18 15:04
2018] blank  checks:  emergencies  &  executive  action 915
ing the lowest risk to human health and the environment.38  Further, a SNAP
determination is not an ultimatum, but the EPA may assign one of four dif-
ferent designations for the classification of a substitute.39  While the SNAP
program is intended to provide a smoother process for industry to transition
to more environmentally safe alternatives, the EPA found in this statutory
framework what it claimed to be an ambiguity such that within the 2015 Rule
there was an open question as to the extent of the reach of the “replacement
power” provided in this portion of the CAA: the replacement of a
replacement.
II. IMPETUS FOR ANALYSIS: MEXICHEM FLUOR V. EPA
The August 2017 D.C. Circuit Court decision in Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v.
EPA40 arose from the EPA’s interpretation of their own authority to act
under the section 612 SNAP program within the 2015 Rule.41  The opinion
raises a series of concerns regarding the efficacy of executive agencies acting
with practical autonomy in times of emergency, especially when using an
argument of presidential authority as their authorization to act.42  In writing
the majority opinion, Kavanaugh compared the alarmist language used by
the EPA to support its policy concerns for promulgating the 2015 Rule—
specifically the portion about replacing HFCs with further replacements—as
reminiscent of the calls for the necessity of urgency in responding to terror-
ism in the wake of 9/11.  In other words, the basic premise of this argument
is a policy rationale that the traditional avenues of bicameralism and present-
ment, as well as proper delegation of legislative authority to the executive,
can be bypassed in emergency circumstances.  Although the bulk of the
majority opinion is spent discussing that HFCs, by definition, are not ozone-
depleting substances and therefore go beyond the statutory grant of section
612, this statutory interpretation argument is not the focus of this Note.
Rather, this Note considers the parallels drawn by Kavanaugh between terror-
ism and climate change, highlighting both as examples of universal and time-
sensitive matters.  Additionally, this Note expands this syllogism to explore
the separation of powers issues that would arise if the EPA’s reasoning were
taken to its logical end.
This comparison of climate change and terrorism is an almost passing
remark buried in the middle of the majority opinion where Kavanaugh
emphasizes the important implications of a decision favoring the EPA.  By
juxtaposing the EPA actions in response to threats of global climate change
in the Mexichem case with the weighty decisions made by the George W. Bush
38 Overview of SNAP, supra note 36.  These criteria include the atmospheric effects, an
exposure assessment, toxicity data, flammability, and other environmental impacts like
ecotoxicity or local air quality impacts. Id.
39 Id.  The four classifications are acceptable, acceptable subject to use conditions,
acceptable subject to narrowed use limits, and unacceptable alternative.
40 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
41 Id. at 453.
42 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 5, 32, 42.
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administration in responding to global threats of terrorism, Kavanaugh
illuminates this overlap by calling upon Justice Breyer’s concurrence in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.43  In context, Kavanaugh simply states that the separa-
tion of powers issues present in the Mexichem case, specifically those regard-
ing the EPA’s authority to regulate under section 612, graft onto the
argument presented by Justice Breyer in the context of the war against al-
Qaeda.44  In the Hamdan concurrence, Justice Breyer states that “war is not a
blank check for the President” to act without Congressional approval, echo-
ing the often-recalled Youngstown Steel tripartite analysis called upon by the
judiciary to determine the strength of the executive’s action originally argued
by Justice Jackson.45  Kavanaugh not only cites and quotes the Hamdan deci-
sion in his Mexichem opinion, but also completes the comparison by stating
that “[s]o too, climate change is not a blank check for the President.”46  By
implication, the threat of climate change is likewise not a blank check for
executive agency action.47
It is important to note that the decision in Mexichem was not a policy
objection to the EPA’s regulation of HFCs due to their impact on climate
change.  In fact, the majority opinion sympathizes heavily with the EPA’s pol-
icy objective in light of the importance of climate change issues.48  Further,
the petitioners do not deny that the EPA could likely find other legal
grounds for achieving their goal of regulating those HFCs currently in use by
industry as a replacement for a class I or class II substance.49  In this way, the
suit itself could be seen as more akin to a stalling mechanism for Mexichem
to allow them to continue production in the short term, rather than a full-
hearted argument that the EPA lacks all authority to regulate the consump-
tion of HFCs currently in use by industry.  To this point, Justice Breyer high-
lights in Hamdan that there are no structural blocks preventing the
President, or any agency, from returning to Congress when it has determined
that their actions will go beyond the grounds of their authority and request-
ing legislation authorizing their proposed actions.50  So too, here there are
not presently any structural roadblocks preventing the EPA from requesting
an extension of its regulatory power under Title VI to include second genera-
tion replacements.  Therefore, the failure of the EPA in Mexichem was not
premised on the reasonability of the policy objective at play, but rather
43 Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 460–61 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636
(2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
44 Id. at 460.
45 Id. at 460–61 (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring)).  The
Youngstown Steel analysis is discussed in further detail in Section III.B.
46 Id. at 461.
47 Id.  (“Section 612(c) ‘does not authorize EPA to review substitutes for substances
that are not themselves’ covered ozone-depleting substances.”).
48 Id. at 461 (“However much we might sympathize or agree with EPA’s policy objec-
tives, EPA may act only within the boundaries of its statutory authority.”).
49 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 11.  For example, a proposed area of authority
is section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
50 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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boiled down to an Agency’s complete reliance upon a grant of authority from
a source constitutionally unauthorized to provide it: the President.
A. The Chevron Analysis
As the subject of this suit was an executive Agency’s interpretation of a
federal statute, the court was required to look at the statute through a Chev-
ron analysis to determine if the Agency’s understanding warranted deference
by the court.  Although the Chevron analysis of the Mexichem decision is
largely beyond the scope of this discussion of autonomous action by execu-
tive agencies during emergency scenarios, it is an important element of mod-
ern separation of powers jurisprudence.  Presently, the courts must rely upon
deference to agency interpretation of either federal statutes or their own reg-
ulations so long as Congress has not spoken clearly in the alternative and the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.51  This approach, which allows agen-
cies a good deal of autonomy, illustrates the ways in which some scholars
argue that executive agencies bend the traditional roles—and rules—set out
in the Constitution for the three branches of government, and leaves open
the question of if/when agencies might act constitutionally in an
emergency.52
In Mexichem, Kavanaugh did engage in the requisite, albeit brief, Chevron
analysis to determine if the EPA’s interpretation of section 612 in the 2015
Rule warranted deference.  After reasoning that the text of section 612 is
“sufficiently clear” and not ambiguous, Kavanaugh determined that in accor-
dance with Chevron step one, the EPA’s interpretation was not entitled to
deference as there was not ambiguity in the statutory grant of authority, and
therefore the court need not defer to the EPA’s interpretation.53
The lengthy dissent in Mexichem, written by Judge Wilkins, argues that
the majority was largely incorrect due to its Chevron analysis.  Judge Wilkins
contends that the word “replace” in the context of section 612 of the CAA is
open to multiple meanings, and is thus definitionally ambiguous, unlike the
majority’s holding.  As such, the dissent argues that the court ought to have
proceeded to a Chevron step two analysis to look at whether the EPA’s inter-
pretation was reasonable.54
III. THE STATUS QUO OF CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
Under ordinary circumstances, the constitutional framework for the sep-
aration of powers amongst the three distinct branches of the United States
government does not provide necessity as a rationale for actions deviating
51 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
52 This topic is discussed in more detail in Section III.A.
53 Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 459 (“Put simply, EPA’s strained reading of the term
‘replace’ contravenes the statute and thus fails at Chevron step 1.”).
54 Id. at 464–65 (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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from the established structure.55  While it is true that the Constitution
expressly contemplates three branches of the federal government, our mod-
ern governmental system includes what Justice Scalia coined as a “new
[b]ranch” of government: the executive and independent agencies.56  The
discussion of the constitutionality of the extent and power of agencies in the
present day, even under ordinary circumstances, is a nuanced and highly
politicized debate.  The stakes of these debates are only heightened in an
emergency situation.  For the purposes of this Note, a high level of generality
is sufficient to discuss the ordinary modes of operation in the federal govern-
ment as outlined by the constitutional commitment to a separation of pow-
ers.  This discussion will demonstrate that necessity has not been held by the
Court to be a sufficient explanation for autonomous executive action.  In
order to discuss fully the extent of the executive branch, I will begin with a
conversation about presidential power and then extend the conversation to
the executive agencies.
A. Presidential Powers of the Executive Branch
The President derives his/her powers either directly or implicitly from
the Constitution,57 or through statutory grants of authority from Congress.
It would be an injustice to the entire field of constitutional studies to attempt
to accurately summarize all of the nuances of Article II here; however, there
are some notable elements that help to demonstrate unilateral presidential
actions, regardless of emergency circumstances.  One theory of presidential
constitutional power under Article II is the “strong unitary executive”
approach.  Alexander Hamilton argued for this understanding throughout
the Federalist Papers as he explained the rationale of the Founders in their
decisions surrounding the structure of the Constitution and how it should be
interpreted moving forward.58  Derived from the Article II Vesting Clause,
the unitary executive premise argues that the President is given all powers
55 However, it is true that the Constitution does provide Congress, but not the execu-
tive, with the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).  Yet
the Supreme Court has held numerous times that this grant of necessity is hemmed by the
requirement that the action be proper.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
324–25 (1819) (“Necessary powers must here intend such powers as are suitable and fitted to
the object; such as are best and most useful in relation to the end proposed.”); see also Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
158–59 (1992).
56 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57 U.S. CONST. art. II (Commander in Chief, pardon power, Take Care Clause,
appointment power, removal power, treaties power, recess appointments, adjourn or con-
vene Congress, veto power (found in Article I), and delivery of the State of the Union
address).
58 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 70, 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
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traditionally vested within the executive in the common law, hemmed only
be those powers explicitly delegated to Congress.59
In general, history has favored this unitary executive theory of presiden-
tial power because it is often more efficient and effective for the nation to
speak with one unified voice, particularly in volatile situations like emergen-
cies.  In addition to the ambiguous executive powers contained within the
Vesting Clause, there are nine major powers of the President expressly
included in the Constitution: Commander in Chief, pardon power, Take
Care Clause, appointment power, removal power, treaties power, recess
appointments, adjourn or convene Congress, veto power, and delivery of the
State of the Union address.60
There are three presidential powers that are relevant to a President’s
ability to act and react to emergent scenarios: the Take Care Clause, Com-
mander-in-Chief Power, and the ability to promulgate executive orders.
Although the President maintains a great deal of unilateral power in all of
the powers given him/her by the Constitution, they are beyond the argument
of this Note.  In general, the President is given wide deference to act in the
field of foreign affairs or with war powers in order to present a unified front
to foreign countries; yet, even still this power can be tailored by powers given
explicitly to Congress.61  For domestic issues, the President can rely upon
inherent executive powers as well as the Take Care Clause, which provides a
lot of leeway for presidential action so long as it can arguably be considered a
part of the faithful execution of the law.62
B. Executive Power Exercised Through Agencies
In addition to the President, the executive branch includes numerous
executive agencies deriving their authority from legislative delegations of
power.  There are open questions about the nebulous concept of executive
power being divided between the President and the executive agencies; but
what is clear throughout constitutional law is that agencies are only empow-
ered to make rules consistent with the law that was enacted through the
processes of bicameralism and presentment.63  All agency action must be
authorized statutorily in order for that agency to have the jurisdiction to reg-
ulate any particular action; a well-intentioned policy objective—even if scien-
tifically correct—does not authorize an agency to act.64  An agency must have
a law justifying its action.
59 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.”).
60 See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I–II.
61 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (establishing that Congress has the power to act outside of
its expressly delegated authority when doing so would be “necessary and proper” to fulfill
the aims expressly delegated under the Constitution); see generally Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotof-
sky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
62 U.S. CONST. art. II., § 3.
63 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952–54 (1983).
64 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
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Broadly, it would be fair to say that supporters of the robust agency
model praise the proliferation of agencies because of their efficiency and
their ability to allow specialists to review, create, and control policy within
their given area of expertise rather than leaving Congress to grapple with
complicated and technical topics.65  Critics of extensive agency delegation
argue that the current proliferation of agency power is contrary to the Consti-
tution’s separation of powers scheme because agencies are free from most
meaningful checks or balances against their actions after the initial legislative
delegation of authority.  As long as an agency acts within its statutory author-
ity, there are no institutional checks on its action beyond the cursory, judicial
Chevron review.  Agencies are frequently vested with both the duty to create
regulations as well as to enforce them, thus frequently practicing both law-
making and enforcement authority, despite those powers belonging explicitly
to other branches.66
In spite of these concerns of unwieldy autonomy, the practice of delegat-
ing power to agencies has flourished and is currently a key part of the opera-
tion of the United States governmental system.  The omnipresent reality of
agency action can make it difficult for scholars, practitioners, and courts alike
to recall that the Constitution does not contemplate the specific existence of
the hundreds of executive agencies currently in operation, so all of their
authority must be derived from delegations of authority from another
branch.67  The EPA, for example, was not considered by the Founding
Fathers when the Constitution was written, so all of its authority must be
derived elsewhere.68
It is a fundamental principle of the separation of powers that the execu-
tive branch does not have legislative authority, either of its own volition or as
delegated by a presumably well-intentioned but constitutionally imprecise
65 See generally JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).  It should be
noted that Landis’ views represent a rather extreme promotion of the administrative state,
not necessarily the norm.
66 In arguing against the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission in the Mis-
tretta dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that the impact of the majority decision would not be
about the extent of agency power, but “about the creation of a new Branch altogether, a
sort of junior-varsity Congress.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
67 See generally Clyde Wayne Crews, Nobody Knows How Many Federal Agencies Exist, COM-
PETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://cei.org/blog/nobody-knows-how-many-
federal-agencies-exist.
68 The EPA was created through Congressional approval under the encouragement of
President Richard Nixon on December 2, 1970 through the passage of Reorganization
Plan Number 3. The Guardian: Origins of the EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https:/
/archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/guardian-origins-epa.html (last updated Sept. 6, 2016).
Created from various committees and administrations previously in existence, the EPA cen-
tralized these various environmental initiatives into a single body, pulling “three federal
Departments, three Bureaus, three Administrations, two Councils, one Commission, [and]
one Service.” Id.  President Nixon appointed William D. Ruckelshaus as the first EPA
Administrator. Id.
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Congress.69  Finally, although it may seem too elementary, it is important to
explicitly state that the “President is not an agency,” and that this simple
truth has been confirmed by the Supreme Court on two occasions.70  In con-
clusion, there are two clear and distinct elements of the Article II executive
branch: the President and the executive agencies.71
C. As Applied to Mexichem
In the context of the 2015 Rule, the EPA grounds its authority for action
in the President’s 2013 CAP, which presents a number of issues.72  The EPA’s
grant of statutory authority to regulate under section 612, while properly
granted through the appropriate channels by Congress, makes clear that any
additions to this authority would likewise require congressional approval as
an amendment to the law.73  It is also clear that any President is freely
allowed to give suggestions, recommendations, or urgings to Congress or the
agencies to express their commitment to a particular cause; however, these
discussions do not have the force of law.74  Here, President Obama’s CAP was
an appropriate means of expressing his commitment to the prevention of
further digression of climate change activity to Congress and the EPA; never-
theless, it does not have weight as legal authority, which arguably an execu-
tive order might.  The EPA rightfully understood the President’s tone in the
CAP, but mistakenly believed it to be a grant of unilateral authority to act in
whatever way necessary to achieve the goal presented regardless of existing
69 See Leanna M. Anderson, Note, Executive Orders, “The Very Definition of Tyranny,” and
the Congressional Solution, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
589, 590 (2002).  However, this proposition is somewhat complicated by the President’s
authority to issue executive orders, which critics argue effectively allows the President to
legislate with little to no meaningful judicial check. Id. at 592–93.
70 Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1108 &
n.39 (2009).
71 This confusion of boundaries between the Presidency and agencies arises in the
context of agency power because the APA is less than clear in its definition of what consti-
tutes an agency under its jurisdiction.  According to the APA, its authority, as defined by
Congress within the statute, only explicitly excludes the Court and Congress from the
“authority of the government of the United States,” and is silent about the President. Id. at
1108 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2006)).
72 Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 8.
73 It is not unprecedented that Congress would approve this expansion of authority.
The CAA was amended in both 1977 and 1990.  In both circumstances, the EPA’s authority
was greatly increased; for example, the addition of Title VI to the CAA through the 1990
Amendments gave the EPA authority to take various different steps to prevent the deple-
tion of the ozone layer. Highlights of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/highlights-1990-clean-air-act-amend
ments.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2016).
74 The caveat to this understanding is the executive order, which is interpreted with
the force of law.  However, the next President, without many structural barriers to prevent
them, can easily overturn standing executive orders. See Kristen Bialik, Obama Issued Fewer
Executive Orders on Average than Any President Since Cleveland, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 23,
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/23/obama-executive-orders/.
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law.  This understanding is incorrect as a matter of statutory interpretation
and constitutional law, even under the guise of necessity in an emergency.
IV. POWERS IN THE EMERGENCY CONTEXT
An important caveat to most rules or standards of conduct is an emer-
gency situation.  The word “emergency” invokes the need for immediate
action, without time for negotiation or conversation.  The Constitution
explicitly prepares for some contingency scenarios, like the fact that although
Article I provides Congress alone with the power to declare war, the Article
III courts have recognized that in certain circumstances the President, using
the Article II Commander-in-Chief power, ought to be able to take military
action without a congressional declaration of war.75  This scenario is con-
firmed especially in the event that the President is acting against enemy
forces or to repel an attack.76  The question of who and how to respond to
emergencies becomes increasingly less clear, however, when agencies stand
poised as the best candidate for action.  This is the circumstance considered
by the D.C. Circuit in Mexichem, where the EPA was implicitly arguing that
the time-pressing and universal nature of climate change warranted allowing
the EPA to act autonomously, whether or not regulation of HFCs was war-
ranted under section 612.
Legal scholar Adrian Vermeule’s work explores the role of executive
agencies in emergencies.77  His arguments are largely premised upon the
reality that most administrative law is based upon “open-ended standards or
adjustable parameters,” like the standards of review for agency decisions:
arbitrary and capricious, reasonableness, and clarity of the statute.78
Vermuele argues that these relatively low standards of review, coupled with
discretion for agency interpretations such as Chevron, allow the courts a great
deal of discretion to adjust their scrutiny at any time.  This particular charac-
teristic is especially poignant when responding to how an agency has acted in
an emergency scenario.79  In one piece, Vermeule sets forth the legal theo-
ries of Carl Schmitt, who argues that emergencies cannot realistically be gov-
erned through highly specified rules—like a fire drill, for instance—but
rather must be handled through after-the-fact standards, which allow for
more case-by-case analysis.80  At most, Schmitt argues that a legal system can
“specify who will have the power to act during an emergency, but not what
75 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
76 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 691–93 (1863); see supra notes 57–62 and
accompanying text.
77 Vermeule, supra note 70, at 1097–98.
78 Id. at 1097; see also id. at 1105 (“[T]he good cause standard is an adjustable parame-
ter that can be invoked by an agency, and interpreted broadly by a court, in circumstances
of perceived emergency.”).
79 See id. at 1097 (“[C]ourts can and do adjust during perceived emergencies to
increase deference to administrative agencies.”).
80 Id. at 1101.
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counts as a valid exception,” to the normal rule of law.81  This difficulty of
defining what constitutes an emergency or exception as well as determining
who has the authority to choose the definition is the gray area that gives
environmentalists a justification for pursuing autonomous agency action in
the fight against climate change.  Climate change poses immediate dangers
and imminent harm, a phenomenon that can arguably be defined as an
emergency (albeit a more long-term, overarching emergency).  This same
argument, as previously discussed, was proliferated in the context of terror-
ism and war powers after the September 11, 2001, attacks.82
Importantly, however, Vermeule and Schmitt both agree that the key
legal preparation for emergency is the determination of who has the power
to act when an emergency strikes—a question that can be settled before an
emergency occurs.  On the question of climate change, this determination is
of particular constitutional significance.  I argue that our constitutional struc-
ture, especially with a view toward legal and structural stability, necessitates
that this power belongs to the President or Congress, and not the executive
agencies.
In order to arrive at this conclusion, this Section explores both the his-
torical and present-day approaches to emergency powers of the President
and demonstrates that in some circumstances the President has historically
been empowered to act by the Constitution.  When he or she is so empow-
ered, the President may then utilize this power to compel agency action
through an executive order.83
A. Historical Approach to Emergency Powers of the President
It is universally accepted that the President has discretion to act unilater-
ally in certain circumstances and even retains emergency powers in the realm
of foreign affairs and war powers.  For a broader view of how presidential
powers are determined and measured by the Court when they are not explic-
itly addressed, the analysis of the Supreme Court in the 1952 decision in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 84 is illustrative.  The various interpreta-
tions of the Court between the majority and the concurrences illustrate the
difficulty for Article III courts in determining the power and extent of execu-
tive powers, even within a wartime context.
The most enduring element of the Youngstown Steel decision is the tripar-
tite framework of Justice Jackson’s concurrence, which provides a helpful
methodology for courts to determine when the executive has potentially
acted beyond its constitutional power.85  Accordingly, Justice Jackson set out
three categories of executive action: (1) when the President acts with specific
81 Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
82 See id. at 1100.
83 Executive orders have been held by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to be binding
upon agency action. See generally Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
84 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
85 Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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statutory authorization by Congress, (2) when the President acts when there
is silence from Congress, and (3) when the President takes actions contrary
to Congressional acts.  If the President acts under specific statutory authoriza-
tion from Congress, the action is presumed to be valid, thus category one of
the Youngstown Steel framework provides the strongest executive power.86
Conversely, when the President acts contrary to Congress, the executive
power is at its “lowest ebb” and the Court may approach the action very criti-
cally.87  When the President acts with neither a congressional grant nor
denial, however, Justice Jackson deemed the President to be acting in the
“zone of twilight,” which requires a fact-dependent analysis to determine if
the actions taken by the executive were constitutional.88
In Youngstown Steel, the Court determined that President Truman was
acting in category two of Justice Jackson’s framework, or the zone of twilight,
because Congress had not expressly granted or denied the power to seize the
steel mill industry.89  Yet, even in the context of the Korean War, the
Supreme Court held that the government’s arguments of necessity, or in
another sense emergency, were insufficient to warrant autonomous executive
action.  It is clear both from the majority opinion and Justice Jackson’s con-
currence that an argument of necessity, even in the context of war, was insuf-
ficient to justify executive overreach.  Importantly, Youngstown Steel also set
the precedent that when the Article III branch determines that the executive
branch has acted with powers beyond its discretion, even during a time of
war, the executive must cease the unconstitutional action and comply with
the check of its power.
Although it is likely true that the present-day use of the Youngstown Steel
framework far exceeds the precedential value of a concurring decision, it is
frequently invoked as an interpretative lens in the academic study of the
executive branch powers, especially in the context of foreign affairs.90  An
open question remains concerning how the Youngstown Steel analysis for
actions of the executive applies to the entire executive branch, specifically execu-
tive agencies.
B. A Lack of Consensus: The Modern Approach to Emergency Power
In the modern context, discussion of the emergency powers frequently
arises in debates surrounding the appropriate response to terrorism and
active threats made against the country.  This conversation surrounds ques-
tions as to which branch or department of the government is best suited to
86 Id. at 635.
87 Id. at 637–38.
88 Id. at 637.  In the circumstance where a President has acted in a category two scena-
rio, the “actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contem-
porary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.” Id.
89 Id. at 588–89 (majority opinion).
90 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COM-
MENT. 87 (2002); David H. Moore, Taking Cues from Congress: Judicial Review, Congressional
Authorization, and the Expansion of Presidential Power, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019 (2015).
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act in order to mitigate injury while maintaining constitutional order, as illus-
trated by the work of Vermeule.91  Unlike the context of an environmental
crisis, the executive—via the President—is given explicit authority to act in
the case of a foreign affairs or war time emergency in Article II of the Consti-
tution.92  In this way, the EPA’s actions regarding climate change are wholly
different than the President’s decisions regarding terrorism and prisoners of
war.  Yet, Kavanaugh illustrates the point of intersection between the blank
checks of power withheld from the EPA in Mexichem and those withheld from
the President in Hamdan.  To illustrate the connection underwriting this
link, it is imperative to understand a fundamental divide in modern legal
theory as to how emergency scenarios ought to be studied, regardless of the
emergency’s topic, urgency, or severity.
As Professor Wayne McCormack explains, there are two different
approaches, at least academically, as to how emergency scenarios ought to be
considered jurisprudentially.93  These two schools of thought regarding the
allowance of variance to constitutional norms in emergency actions are
labeled the “no” camp and the “maybe” camp.94  The “no” camp advocates
for following ordinary constitutional procedures, even in the face of an emer-
gency scenario.95  Justice Breyer, like Kavanaugh, firmly defends the “no”
camp in his Hamdan concurrence, with the belief that an emergency scenario
does not constitute an appropriate excuse to override constitutional norms
and, in fact, refusing to follow the democratic structural norms weakens the
United States’ ability to respond.96  In the alternative, the “maybe” argument
is based on the idea that emergencies require immediate responses, and Con-
gress or the Court has the ability to retroactively approve illegal actions taken
during an emergency to remedy any preexisting constitutional concerns.97
This view aligns with that of Carl Schmitt in Professor Vermeule’s analysis.
91 See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
92 This authority is grounded in the express provisions of the Constitution through the
Commander-in-Chief power as well as the ambassador appointment and treaty powers.
U.S. CONST. art. II § 2; see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 691–92 (1863).
93 Wayne McCormack, Emergency Powers and Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REV. 69 (2005).
94 Id. at 73–74.
95 Id. at 73 (“Most advocates for the ‘No’ position tend to argue that it is important for
constitutional norms to remain fixed, even if officials will violate those norms without con-
sequence during emergencies.”).
96 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Where, as
here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that con-
sultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger.  To the contrary, that
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—
how best to do so.  The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means.”).
97 See McCormack, supra note 93, at 73; see also Bruce Ackerman, Essay, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030–31 (2004) (“[T]he self-conscious design of an emer-
gency regime may well be the best available defense against a panic-driven cycle of perma-
nent destruction.”).
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This debate was actively ignited and debated amongst academics in the early
2000s after 9/11.98
It is not only Justice Breyer’s concurrence that argues for the “no” camp.
In the Hamdan majority, the Court addressed several questions surrounding
the jurisdiction of a military commission to assess an al-Qaeda prisoner of
war’s habeas corpus proceedings.  Although there are important differences
in the types of conflict and deviation requested by the President in Hamdan
versus the EPA in the 2015 Rule, the Hamdan decision illustrates the Court’s
reluctance to support deviations from constitutional requirements, despite
the gravity of the situation.  Importantly, even in the context of the “danger
posed by international terrorism,” the Court held that it was “not evident . . .
[that the threat of international terrorism] should require . . . any variance”
from ordinary military commission proceedings or procedures.99  The Court
further argued that the standard for deviation from the ordinary rules would
require a showing of impracticability by the agency in question.100  Although
the President argued in Hamdan that the danger to the United States
presented by international terrorism made the application of the military
commission’s rules and principles impracticable, the majority disagreed.101
It is clear that even for the most functionalist of justices, like Justices Stevens
and Breyer, the clear and pressing threat of international terrorism alone is
not sufficient to allow the President, or an executive agency, to act contrary
to the ordinary procedures of constitutional authority.
On the other hand, the “maybe” camp’s position holds a very real func-
tionalist appeal that is intuitively enticing because it allows the perceived
threats of an emergency situation to be addressed immediately by the execu-
tive and leaves the difficult questions of whether the action was appropriate
to be answered later.  This approach is counter to the established processes
that were painstakingly written into the Constitution and defended repeat-
edly by the Court.  For instance, the conscious use of processes like bicamera-
lism, presentment, delegation of authority, and the commitment to a written
Constitution illustrate that these procedures were all elements of the process
used to maintain the functioning of the United States’ federal separation of
98 See Ackerman, supra note 97, at 1030–31; David Cole, Essay, The Priority of Morality:
The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1785 (2004); Oren Gross, Chaos
and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011,
1021–24 (2003); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, Essay, The Anti-Emergency Con-
stitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1867 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections
on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273.
99 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 623–24.
100 Id. at 624 (stating that “[t]he absence of any showing of impracticability” makes the
President’s argument “particularly disturbing”).
101 Id. at 622 (“[T]he President’s determination that ‘the danger to the safety of the
United States and the nature of international terrorism’ renders it impracticable ‘to apply
in military commissions . . . the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recog-
nized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts,’ . . . is, in the Govern-
ment’s view, explanation enough for any deviation from court-martial procedures.”
(citation omitted)).
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powers structure.  Therefore, despite the safety valve that a “maybe” perspec-
tive provides in terms of unforeseen emergency scenarios, when the govern-
ment considers how it will respond to emergencies, it should operate within
the ordinary procedures of constitutional authority.  The guise of necessity is
an insufficient mask for overriding the ordinary separation of powers, even in
hindsight.
C. Emergency Powers in the Context of an Executive Agency
It would be inaccurate to argue that emergency powers of an executive
agency are a constitutional impossibility.  Congress foresaw the benefit of
tasking a particular agency with specific emergency powers and explicitly put
in place a mechanism to address some emergencies through the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  FEMA was created specifically to
provide both a rapid and congressionally specified response to natural disas-
ters and avoid unnecessary bureaucratic slowdown in the moment of a catas-
trophe.102  FEMA is an executive agency created by an executive order of
President Carter to amalgamate all of the various disaster response mecha-
nisms of the federal government into a single entity.103  Yet, despite this
important move toward efficiency in responding to emergencies, it is impera-
tive to note that FEMA itself cannot act until the President declares a state of
emergency and initiates the statutory mechanism for agency action.104  A fur-
ther development in FEMA’s role in emergency response occurred in 2003
when it became a part of the United States Department of Homeland Secur-
ity in order to “help communities face the threat of terrorism” and provide a
“coordinated approach to national security from emergencies and disasters—
both natural and man-made.”105
While is it clear that Congress has delegated some emergency powers to
FEMA, there are two important caveats that factor into this analysis of execu-
tive agency emergency powers.  First, FEMA is only given the jurisdiction to
respond to emergencies when the President has declared a state of emer-
gency; FEMA’s delegation of emergency authority is contingent upon presi-
dential declaration.106  Second, the circumstance in which FEMA is invoked
are those events that are both rapidly developing and rapidly concluding,
such as terrorism and natural disasters.  The emphasis is placed on recovery
after an emergency has occurred and plans for how to best execute a support
effort.  These factors of FEMA’s response mechanism leave open the ques-
tion of when and how an agency ought to properly respond to a longer-term
threat, especially those that could still be considered an emergency, in some
respects, due to the magnitude, scale, or relative time pressure.  Although





106 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2012).
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technically these longer-term emergencies could arguably be within the mis-
sion of FEMA, it would be impractical for all emergency preparation and
response to fall to one agency when the very purpose of the administrative
state is to allow a vast group of particular experts to deliberate and respond
to the needs of the country on their topic of expertise.107
Although it would clearly be quite efficient to allow executive agencies to
act in the occasion of an emergency within their field of expertise, without a
grant of authority from Congress or the President, a blank check of this sort
would be contrary to the separation of powers doctrines that guide the func-
tioning of the federal government.  In order to best protect the nation in
times of emergency, both those immediately present and the more long-
term, following the standard rule of law will in the end be more efficient and
a better safeguard of liberty.  Just as in the circumstance of a fire drill at a
school, when the procedure is widely known and practiced, all parties under-
stand their role and the province of their authority in a time of crisis.  So too
when the federal government follows the rule of law in times of emergency,
rather than shortcutting for a perceived time decrease, does it provide stabil-
ity and a clear line of authority for action.  Therefore, all actions of any exec-
utive agency, even in a time of emergency, must be derived in a grant of
delegated authority from Congress or the President and be not contrary to
established law.
V. BLANK CHECKS AND ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES
Climate change, like terrorism, demands a response warranted by what it
is: an emergency.  However, the response to both climate change and terror-
ism ought to be guided by the separation of powers doctrines through which
both the Court and the Constitution have clearly designated a constitutional
protocol for the federal government’s response and exercise of lawmaking
powers: bicameralism, presentment, and a delegation of authority to agen-
cies.108  Although appealing, the “blank check” mentality in which either the
President or an agency would be free to act in accordance with the necessity
of the situation is a bad idea in both the terrorism and climate change con-
texts.  This argument that emergency situations or claims of necessity are
insufficient to warrant unilateral executive agency action acknowledges both
the challenge presented by limiting the quickest option for action, bypassing
Congress, as well as the reality that there are several alternative constitutional
mechanisms that could be used by the agency in order to acquire appropri-
ate authority for the desired action.  Of these possible mechanisms, the three
that may be effective in the context of regulating HFCs would include (1) a
107 About the Agency, supra note 102 (during the Obama administration, FEMA’s mission
was “to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work
together to build, sustain and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from and mitigate all hazards”) (on file with author).
108 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (“The Founders
of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad
times.” (emphasis added)).
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request by the EPA for an explicit statutory grant of authority from Congress,
(2) the issuance of an executive order that provides authorization, without
contravening established law,109 or (3) the EPA’s use of a different statutory
authority from which to derive their actions.  This Section will briefly explore
each of these possible solutions for the EPA’s desire to regulate HFCs in the
context of a climate change emergency and a response to a possible counter-
argument.  Although these solutions are presented in light of the EPA, they
would be reasonable methods for any executive agency to respond to an
emerging or long-term emergency.
A. Requesting a Grant of Authority from Congress
There are no structural constitutional barriers that prevent any agency
from asking Congress directly for a statutory grant of authority or for an
expansion of their preexisting statutory authority.  In the context of Mex-
ichem, it would not be beyond the power of the EPA to request a statutory
expansion or amendment to the CAA, or perhaps even an entirely new piece
of legislation that could allow for the regulation of any HFCs currently in use
by industry, whether or not it is the replacement of an ozone-depleting sub-
stance.  As of present, it is true that “Congress has not yet enacted general
climate change legislation,” but the prospect of such legislation that
addresses the global problem head-on is not beyond the realm of possibilities
and has been raised, as the threat of climate change has become increasingly
acknowledged as imminent.110  Kavanaugh’s opinion denying the EPA’s abil-
ity to regulate HFCs under the 2015 Rule clearly leaves open the possibility
that HFCs should, perhaps even ought, to be regulated; however the current
statutory basis claimed by the EPA was an insufficient source for the actions
taken.111  The Mexichem opinion leaves wide open the possibility that under a
proper statutory basis the EPA would be empowered and likely even
encouraged to assert its authority in responding to the consistent, emergent
threat of climate change.
However, it is true that this alternative for action does not override the
consistent concern for emergency action: the slow response time of Con-
gress.  Further, it is true that the grant of authority requested by the EPA,
here or in the case of any agency action, is contingent upon congressional
partisans reaching a compromise and moving forward, an event of decreas-
109 In this way, if, assuming arguendo, President Obama’s Climate Action Plan of 2013
was interpreted to be an executive order, the EPA was still not authorized to act in the way
that it did through the 2015 Rule.  This is because as the Court ruled in Mexichem, the 2015
Rule was contrary to the statutory text of the CAA, and therefore was not enforceable as an
executive order.  Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert.
denied sub nom. Nat Res. Def. Council v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc., 866 F.3d 451 (2018).
110 Id. at 460.
111 Id. (“Although we understand and respect EPA’s overarching effort to fill that legis-
lative void and regulate HFCs, EPA may act only as authorized by Congress.  Here, EPA has
tried to jam a square peg (regulating non-ozone-depleting substances that may contribute
to climate change) into a round hole (the existing statutory landscape).”).
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ing occurrence.  Yet, despite the potentially slow nature of an agency receiv-
ing a congressional grant of authority, such a grant results in a firm assurance
that there is no question of the agency’s power to respond if or when an
emergency scenario does arise.
B. Issuing a Valid Executive Order
A second possible way of extending the EPA’s authority to regulate and
respond to climate change would be through the execution of a valid execu-
tive order from the President.  Like asking Congress for an additional grant
of statutory authority, the President may choose to empower the executive
agencies to act, through an executive order so long as the content of the
grant of power is not inconsistent with established law.112  In the context of
HFCs, even assuming arguendo that President Obama’s CAP could be consid-
ered an executive order, it only instructed the EPA, and by extension, gave
the EPA permission to use the SNAP portion of the CAA to remove HFCs
from the safe alternatives list; it did not empower the wholesale regulation of
HFCs.113  However, neither the CAP nor the decision in Mexichem precludes
the current or future Presidents from promulgating a much wider executive
order that would allow for the regulation of all HFCs presently in use.  It is
likely that an executive order could be enacted much more rapidly than a
new or expanded statutory grant from Congress as it only requires the action
of the President.  However, an executive order could just as rapidly be dis-
mantled when the next administration comes into power.114  Though in the
face of an emergency, the ability for an executive order to be promulgated
rapidly could negate a lot of the bureaucratic backlog preventing immediate
action, it also raises questions of the efficacy of unilateral legislating by the
President and relying on such potentially problematic grounds for emer-
gency protocol.  Therefore, for a short-term emergency action, an executive
order stands as perhaps the most efficient way for an executive agency to
expand the scope of its power without violating the constitutional separation
of powers, but in the context of longer-term emergencies there are concerns
regarding a meaningful check on the President exercising independent legis-
lative power, when such power belongs to Congress.
C. Using Other Authority: Toxic Substance Control Act
Finally, another way that the EPA could regulate HFCs presently in use
by industry or the “replacements of replacements” would be to draw upon
other statutory authority already given to the Agency by Congress.  For
instance, Kavanaugh in the Mexichem majority opinion specifically cites to the
EPA’s authority under the Toxic Substances Control Act, which allows the
EPA to “directly regulate non-ozone-depleting substances that are causing
harm to the environment,” and would likely include the production and use
112 See generally Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
113 CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 10.
114 See Bialik, supra note 74.
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of HFCs.115  The Mexichem opinion also cites to at least four other statutory
grants of authority from Congress to the EPA that could possibly be drawn
upon by the EPA to assert its authority to regulate the uses of HFCs, espe-
cially given the growth of scientific evidence that links the use of HFCs to the
proliferation of GHGs and, ultimately, harmful climate change.116  It is clear
that although the court in Mexichem did not find that the EPA was empow-
ered to regulate HFCs beyond the replacement of ozone-depleting sub-
stances under the 2015 Rule, this holding does not “in any way cabin those
[other] expansive EPA authorities” from accomplishing the same or similar
tasks.117  In the context of an emergency, such as climate change, where the
importance of urgency is paramount, Mexichem’s discussion of several alterna-
tives for grants of authority to authorize the desired agency action represents
a reminder to executive agencies to consider all alternatives before acting.
D. Efficiency Counterargument
It is clear that the strongest counterargument to the line of reasoning
against executive agencies having unilateral emergency action is largely pre-
mised on the efficiency of the response by the federal government.  The crux
of this argument is based upon the time-tested reality that Congress was
intentionally structured to take action slowly and that consensus is difficult to
obtain.  Ordinarily, these structural speed bumps are praised for helping to
prevent Congress from passing heavily partisan bills or rapidly changing the
face of the United States government.  However, in the context of an emer-
gency, this stalling is unwelcome.  One could easily imagine a scenario in
which a specialized executive agency, like the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, would be best equipped to respond to a rapidly emerging crisis
such that any time spent consulting with the President or Congress could
drastically delay the success of the response.118  In such times of panic, it
would seem reasonable to the average person that following the proper pro-
cedure is no longer of the utmost import, rather the emphasis ought to be on
the lives at stake.
115 Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 460 (citing to 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–29 (2012)).
116 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (National Ambient Air Quality Standards program); id.
§ 7412 (Hazardous Air Pollutants program); id. §§ 7470–92 (Prevention of Significant
Deterioration program); id. § 7521 (section 202 of the CAA) as examples of the EPA’s
statutory authority to regulate harmful substances released into the air).
117 Id.
118 The Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the United States in 2016 provided an epi-
demic emergency in the United States because the disease is highly contagious and lays
dormant for twenty-one days before a paitnet will show symptoms.  In 2016, the CDC had
to respond rapidly to the outbreak in order to prevent further exposure.  Thankfully, the
CDC was able to contain the exposure in the United States and the death toll to only four
diagnosed cases and one death through their quick response time. See 2014–2016 Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/index.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2017).
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The Court does recognize that there could be a scenario in which there
is insufficient time for the President or an executive agency to consult with
Congress before action must be taken.  In these circumstances, where the
response does require such immediate action, the judicial or legislative
processes could deal with the consequences of any violation of the separation
of powers in hindsight.  This is not to say that all executive agencies should
adopt an “ask for forgiveness, not permission” attitude in regard to emer-
gency action.  If such an attitude were the appropriate posture for an execu-
tive agency in any circumstance, then surely the Court would recognize it as
such in one of the most pressing emergency scenarios: terrorism.  Yet the
Court has remained confident that even in the face of terrorism, “[w]here
. . . no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence
upon that consultation [of the President with Congress] does not weaken our
Nation’s ability to deal with danger,”119 but rather remains one of the United
States’ strongest global powers.  If the compromise of constitutional integrity
is not justified to protect against terrorism, it cannot be justified in the con-
text of agency regulation of climate change.
VI. CURRENT STATUS OF MEXICHEM AND ENDURING IMPACT
Although an en banc hearing before the D.C. Circuit was denied in Jan-
uary 2018, the decision in Mexichem has hardly been put to rest.  First, in the
literal sense, on June 25, 2018, the National Resource Defense Council filed
for writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court on the same question
presented to the D.C. Circuit: Whether section 612 of the CAA permits the
EPA to prohibit the use of dangerous, but non–ozone depleting substitutes
(like HFCs), by any person, including “product manufacturers who began
using such substitutes before EPA placed them on the prohibited list?”120
The Natural Resource Defense Council, who intervened on behalf of the
EPA in the circuit decision, argued that Kavanaugh’s majority opinion “guts
not only the HFC rule; [but] rewrites the fundamentals of Section 612,” and
thus makes “the agency . . . powerless to stop companies” from using HFCs or
similarly harmful, but non–ozone depleting chemicals.121  As this Note has
argued, the powerlessness argument, although compelling rhetoric, is a
severe misunderstanding of federal governmental powers at play—if the EPA
is not empowered to regulate HFCs under section 612 specifically, this does
not prevent, wholesale, the regulation of these substances by another means
or method.  Both popular media and the petition for a writ of certiorari fail
to explicitly highlight that at the heart of the disagreement between Kava-
naugh’s majority and Judge Wilkin’s dissent is not a disagreement about the
merits of protecting the environment or manufacturers, but rather about the
appropriate level of deference that ought to be given to federal agencies and
119 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
120 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc.,
866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 18-2).
121 Id. at 4–5.
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the merits of the Chevron doctrine’s ambiguity trigger.  As the petition for
certiorari was denied, this continues to be an open question.122
The Mexichem decision also remained an active topic as the case became
the subject of national headlines during the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh
to the Supreme Court of the United States.  The decision was frequently used
to label Kavanaugh as a “foe” of the environment and a harsh critic of Chev-
ron deference.  Although one of these labels may be apt, it was the backlash
from environmental groups that gained the most traction with popular
media outlets.123  This environmental tide against Kavanaugh’s nomination
was most vocally led by the Sierra Club.  The Sierra Club highlighted several
of Kavanaugh’s opinions regarding the EPA.124  Yet, most jurisprudentially
sophisticated sources, like the law firm Gibson Dunn, correctly categorized
the majority opinion in Mexichem, amongst other EPA related decisions, as an
illustration of administrative law and the dramatic effect of differing views on
Chevron deference within the judiciary.125  Although it is undeniable that
there are environmental effects closely linked to the decision in Mexichem,
the majority opinion provides a greater insight into how Kavanaugh’s admin-
istrative law and separation of powers jurisprudence will affect the Supreme
Court rather than a “disaster for public lands.”126
122 Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub
nom. Nat Res. Def. Council v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc., 866 F.3d 451 (2018).
123 See, e.g., Environmental Groups Troubled by Supreme Court Pick Brett Kavanaugh’s Record,
CBS NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/environmental-groups-trou
bled-by-supreme-court-pick-brett-kavanaughs-record/; Michael Garry, Judge in HFCs Case
Nominated for U.S. Supreme Court, MEDIUM (July 10, 2018), https://medium.com/
naturalrefrigerants/judge-in-hfcs-case-nominated-for-u-s-supreme-court-a0cfc174348f; Fat-
ima Hussein, Brett Kavanaugh’s Quotes Reveal His Stance on the Environment, BLOOMBERG (July
10, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/brett-kava-
naughs-quotes-reveal-his-stance-on-the-environment; Juan Carlos Rodriguez, What Enviro
Lawyers Need To Know About Kavanaugh, LAW360 (July 10, 2018), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1061483/what-enviro-lawyers-need-to-know-about-kavanaugh; David G. Savage,
Judge Kavanaugh Could Give Conservatives the Vote They Need to Rein in EPA Rules on Climate
Change, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-kavanaugh-
environment-20180723-story.html#; Julia Stein, How Would a Justice Kavanaugh Approach
Environmental Cases?, LEGAL PLANET (Aug. 7, 2018), http://legal-planet.org/2018/08/07/
how-would-a-justice-kavanaugh-approach-environmental-cases/.
124 SIERRA CLUB, FIVE EXAMPLES OF BRETT KAVANAUGH’S EXTREME RECORD ON THE ENVI-
RONMENT, https://www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.org/files/blog/Kavanaugh
%20SCOTUS%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2018).
125 President Trump Nominates Judge Brett Kavanaugh To Supreme Court, GIBSON DUNN,
(July 10, 2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/president-trump-nominates-judge-brett-kav
anaugh-to-supreme-court/.
126 Kavanaugh Appointment to Supreme Court Could be Disaster for Public Lands, WILDERNESS
SOC’Y (July 13, 2018), https://wilderness.org/press-release/kavanaugh-appointment-
supreme-court-could-be-disaster-public-lands.
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CONCLUSION
The emergency threats of neither terrorism nor climate change warrant
a blank check for executive agencies to act unilaterally.  Despite the over-
whelming desire to allow for the quickest response to any potential emer-
gency, it would be a dangerous precedent to give such autonomous powers to
the unchecked fourth branch of the government.  As demonstrated in this
Note, although executive agencies rely upon delegations of authority from
the legislative or executive branches for their power, beyond cursory judicial
checks, the agencies are largely left to operate autonomously within their
statutorily granted power.  If an agency, like the EPA, were granted the ability
to act by whatever means the agency deemed necessary in an emergency sce-
nario, it is likely to result in an inefficient response as several moving parts of
the federal government would be acting chaotically rather than in constitu-
tionally designed concert.  Contravening the structural designs of the Consti-
tution would result in a less efficient response, even if action could be taken
more rapidly.  The guise of necessity is an insufficient mask for overriding
the ordinary separation of powers by executive agencies or any governmental
branch, even in hindsight.
And yet, the EPA’s ultimate goal of regulating the use of HFCs by indus-
try aligns with many of the policy objectives of both the Obama and Trump
administrations for reducing the United States’ global environmental impact.
Neither the majority opinion in Mexichem, the separation of powers doc-
trines, nor this Note disagree with the merit of the objective that the EPA was
attempting to achieve through the 2015 Rule and would all actively
encourage the further regulation of HFCs.  However, this objective of the
EPA, as well as any objective from an executive agency that would require an
extension of their statutorily granted power, ought to be reached by any
number of different routes that properly align with constitutional design.
For the regulation of HFCs or another more long-term emergency scenario,
the most logical methods include requesting an additional grant of authority
directly from Congress, waiting for a valid executive order to be issued that
does not contravene present law, or to use a different grant of statutory
authority given to that agency to authorize the agency’s actions.  While it is
likely true that these proposed actions do not represent the quickest
response time by the federal government to an emergent situation, the selec-
tion of one of these options would be the most insulated from a separation of
powers issue and provide an efficient response.  Like Justice Jackson’s first
category of executive power, following one of the suggested routes will pro-
vide the executive agency with the argument of an affirmative grant of
authority that aligns with the basic principles of bicameralism, presentment,
and a valid delegation of power to the agency.
So while it is true that climate change and terrorism warrant a vigorous
response by the federal government, in neither case should that result in a
blank check of power granted to an executive agency.  Rather, if lack of
action taken in the arena of climate change is one of America’s greatest fail-
ures, then the onus to act cannot be attributed to an executive agency with-
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out the autonomous power to act.  If such a failure exists, the obligation to
act lies with the branches that the Constitution authorizes to act: the Presi-
dent and Congress.
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